After firing their last rounds at the town and the column, the German tanks withdrew. CHRAIN. Nearly all the American units in the St. Vith area were already committed; all that General Hasbrouck could do was to station a light tank company, a company of armored engineers, the headquarters battery of an antiaircraft battalion, and a reconnaissance troop piecemeal in a series of small villages south and west of Beho. A small cavalry detachment, Task Force Lindsey (Capt. The most advanced elements of the German Infantry Battalion (Lt. Col. William H. G. Fuller) and B Troop of the On the afternoon of 17 December the 14th Cavalry Group commander had ordered the remnants of his two squadrons to fall back to Recht. there still was a faint hope that the 422d and 423d somehow might be At best these isolated detachments could serve only as pickets for the 7th Armored, but fortunately the German columns continued marching west. One company of Shermans circled in the direction of Wallerode, falling on the enemy flank while the tank destroyers contained the head of the German column on the Hnnange road. CCR headquarters started down. This time the enemy gained Neubrueck and held it, feeding in more troops hourly from the assembly area of Galhausen. After an hour or so the battery turned once again and, taking no chances, circled wide to the west. The First Army headquarters was in process of drafting plans for uniting the XVIII Airborne Corps and the St. Vith force when General Hasbrouck's letter arrived. This group had been delayed by poor roads and American mine fields west of Manderfeld, and by the end of 17 December it was some hours behind the north column. Stone's group was incorporated in Task Force Jones. The 1st SS Panzer Division, forming the left of the I SS Panzer Corps advance in the zone north of St. Vith, had driven forward on two routes. other German units forged westward past its northern and southern extensions. A disabled German self-propelled gun is in the foreground. 34th Field Artillery: US Army: 1943: North Africa: 51st Combat Engineer Battalion: US Army: 1945: Ardennes: Defense of several key Belgian cities against Kampfgruppe Peiper between December 17-22, 1944. By this time Task Force Jones was Bauvenn, no more than a jog in the road, lay three-quarters of a mile north of the natural corridor through which flowed the Braunlauf Creek, the corridor at whose eastern entrance the enemy had attacked the night before in severing. By this time it was obvious to Jones and Clarke that the main forces of the 7th Armored could not reach St. Vith in time to make a daylight attack. d. If the 2d SS Panzer Division attack should succeed in driving back the two RCTs of the 82d Airborne Division now between Salmchteau and Hebronval even as little as 3000 yards we will be completely severed from any source of supplies. There was one fortunate but unexpected event on the 19th. Units to south have apparently been by-passed by some Boche. The main artillery column again missed the 1st SS Panzer Division by only a hair's breadth. The armored infantry were now disposed in the center with the medium tank companies, which had circled through St. Vith, at either flank. Unwilling to risk his tanks without infantry protection in a night fight through narrow streets, and uncertain of the enemy strength, Warren ordered a withdrawal after a sharp 45-minute engagement. Even as a logistical exercise withdrawal presented a Control, as the 18th's commander later reported, was almost nonexistent. Having found a negotiable route for his heavy vehicles, Remer prepared to capture Rodt, cut the main road between that village and Vielsalm, and overrun such of the American batteries as remained in the way. West of Wallerode the 295th Regiment started into the assault, possibly only as a feint, but withdrew as the guns supporting CCB, 7th Armored, went into action. Gen. Robert W. Hasbrouck) was in the XIII Corps reserve, planning for possible commitment in the Ninth Army Operation DAGGER intended to clear the Germans from the west bank of the Roer River once the dams were destroyed.2. Word of this, handed down by Colonel Ryan who had been at the VIII Corps headquarters in Neufchteau and had worked his way back to the division trains, caused a little confusion as to the exact status of the units attached to the 7th Armored Division. To counter this threat the light tank platoon moved into Steinebrck, leaving the American left uncovered. To the commander of the 18th Volks Grenadier Division, whose men had taken St. Vith, the events of 22 December spelled catastrophe; to the Americans falling back from the city they were a godsend. In midmorning of 20 December the Germans in the village deployed skirmishers and began a fire fight to test the American strength around the station. The resulting state of affairs was summed up when the executive officer of CCA reported to the division G-3: "The CO of CCA wanted these facts made known. Who made up the enemy force and its strength is uncertain-probably this was the Mobile Battalion of the 18th Volks Grenadier Division, making the preliminary move in the scheme to encircle St. Vith. The roads to be used were few and in poor state, The occupation of St. Vith had considerably disorganized the attacking division, whose regiments jammed into the town from east, north, and south. by artillery fire, to thrust a few tanks along the east road. The main body of the 1st SS Panzer Division needed reinforcements. This tactical problem was made more difficult for the 18th Volks Grenadier Division and the LXVI Corps by the traffic situation on the roads east and north of Schnberg where columns belonging to the Sixth SS Panzer Army were swinging out of their proper one. of Gouvy. During the afternoon the 7th Armored Division trains, whose officers and men had done a remarkable job in supporting the troops in the salient, got through one last supply column of ninety vehicles to Salmchteau. emplaced along the Recht road northwest of St. Vith, fired concentration On the movement of the main body of the 7th Armored Division on 17 December hung the fate of St. Vith. Over the field telephone General Jones concurred in the opinion furnished Montgomery and Ridgway, but at 1250 Jones dispatched a memo to Ridgway saying, "My intentions are to retain the ground now defended." The division artillery might be in firing position by the morning of the 20th. Shortly after dark Colonel Devine departed with most of his staff for the 106th Division command post, but this command group was ambushed near Recht (Colonel Devine and two of his officers escaped on foot). A heavy barrage (the 62d Volks Grenadier Division by this time had a number of pieces. make its delayed drive east of St. Vith on the morning of the 18th. at any moment. ABMC Headquarters 2300 Clarendon Blvd, Suite 500 Arlington, VA 22201 Phone: 703-584-1501 Some had even climbed out of the Braunlauf valley and engaged in scattering fire against the battalion of the 424th Infantry in the reserve position at Maldingen. Directly east of St. Vith ran the Schnberg highway, which had been the avenue of the very first German attacks, but this road ran over a ridge just outside St. Vith where the Americans had stood successfully to meet all previous enemy thrusts. With the enemy infantry inside Steinebrck and excellent direct laying by the German gunners picking off the American vehicles one by one, the cavalry withdrew along the St. Vith road. The course of battle on 21 December initially affirmed the pessimistic view with which most of German unit commanders seem to have started the attack. The legacy of the Rescue of the Lost Battalion in the history of the 100th/442nd RCT cannot be overstated. It is nearly impossible to find an account of the soldiers that does not recount the dramatic rescue in detail and it is a major feature in the storyline of the films Go For Broke! We may become subjected to enemy artillery fire from practically any direction. From this point on Kampfgruppe Krag fought two battles, one to mop up the town, the other to capture American vehicles trying to break out of the valley road in the south. It stands at the entrance to the valley road which leads to Vielsalm, and mechanized attack from either Recht or Rodt had to funnel through the narrow neck at this crossroads, vehicle maneuver off either of the two approaches being almost impossible. The troops east of St. Vith simply had to be written off (at least 600 officers and men) although some later would be able to work their way back through the German lines. CCB, 7th Armored Division, be it remembered, was a battle-tested outfit of superior morale-as was the entire division-so credit also must go to the unnamed officers, noncoms, and men who withdrew in good order to the new line. The American units flanking the road had been badly understrength. It was on this estimate that General. Actually the pick-up force of quartermaster troops, light tanks, and Finally, in midafternoon, Colonel Nelson (commanding the 112th) appeared at the 106th Division command post and reported his situation, and the regiment was taken over by General Jones-a solution subsequently approved by General Middleton. assembly area, more difficult and tenuous. Admittedly this scratch force was too weak to make a serious defense in the endangered sector, but it could be expected to block the key road junctions and sound a warning should the enemy attempt any flanking movement. The southern column of the 1st SS Panzer Division, which first had captured the town, was long since gone, hurrying west. the connective tissue between the 7th and 9th Armored combat commands. American tank destroyers which had been dug in at a bend in the road The 7th Armored commander, at Hoge's request, got Middleton to cancel the order, and CCB, 9th Armored, subsequently was taken under the First Army command. I just did everything I thought necessary. Although no major disruption had occurred in the ring defense, the night attacks had developed cracks in the line at Crombach and in the valley of the Braunlauf which would widen under a little more pressure. General Clark later phrased the problem thus: Fortunately for the forces in the salient the withdrawal to the "goose egg" defense, a move made with extreme difficulty on muddy and congested roads and trails, was unhampered in its first phases by any German reaction. the two regiments of the 106th Division had been abandoned on 18 December It was after midnight when the engineers finally reported that the charge had been replaced and successfully detonated.7 Even then the span was only partially wrecked and was still capable of bearing foot troops; but the German tanks milling about the burning buildings east of the river would have to find other means of crossing the Salm. After some confusion in getting through the Fuehrer Begleit Brigade around Rodt on the morning of 23 December, the 293d continued along the road to Poteau. At the tail of the column disaster, in the form of the Fuehrer Begleit advance guard, suddenly struck. howitzer batteries of the 965th Field Artillery Battalion (the only corps artillery still in the sector) put more firepower at the disposal of the St. Vith defenders just at a time when the Germans were bringing their guns into position east of town. Colonel Rosebaum sent the tank platoon and an armored infantry company to clear the houses south of the cut. moving along the Bovigny-Salmchteau road which traversed the gap in a column on any one of the roads would be serious. assault, begun after a two-hour fire fight, made a dent in the center Don't move 'til you hear from me. stocks at Gouvy Station east of the village proper, but this fact was While Boylan took on the Germans, Lohse's column circled. General Hasbrouck received a telephone call at 1730 alerting, his division for movement to the south (it took five more hours for the 7th Armored G-2 to learn that "three or four German divisions were attacking"). General Lucht ordered the commander of the 18th Volks Grenadier Division to throw everything he had behind the 294th and continue the attack. Bad road conditions, the blown bridge at Steinebrck, and continued attempts by Sixth Panzer Army columns to usurp the corps main supply road at Schnberg combined to delay Lucht's concentration. Although the corps commander, General Lucht, personally intervened to "rank" the intruders out of the area he seems to have been only moderately successful. Montgomery had consulted with General Hodges, the First Army commander, and here, showed the ability to honor the fighting man which had endeared him to the hearts of the Desert Rats in North Africa: "They can come back with all honor. So he compromised by sending a large combat patrol into the woods west of that village with orders to find a covered route along which the tanks might advance on Vielsalm once they arrived. The attacking troop assembled in Wallerode toward midmorning where they offered wonderful targets for the artillery supporting CCB, 7th Armored. This line was now gravely endangered on its open north flank by the German position astride the ridge at Rodt. He found that General Jones already had turned the defense of St. Vith over to Clarke and the 7th Armored Division. The woods are so thick that he needs almost an infantry platoon to protect three tanks sitting out there. In the chain of command only General Ridgway demurred. The division staff knew little of the tactical situation and nothing of the extent to which the German armored columns had penetrated westward. At Braunlauf the column found a company of the 424th Infantry in a fire fight with German infantry who had sneaked in during the night. up to cover his right rear and had ordered the regiment to seize and The 112th Infantry, now beginning to fold back to the north as the center of the 28th Division gave way, was no longer in contact with the 424th Infantry, its erstwhile left flank neighbor, but the axis of withdrawal ultimately would bring the 112th Infantry to piece out the southern sector of the defense slowly forming around St. Vith. In any case the German armored reserve was not available. On the morning of 20 December the Americans defending St. Vith held The eight battalions of field artillery taking part in the defense were put on a strict ration, seven rounds for each 105-mm. Most of the nine field artillery battalions in the ring had been grouped in this area and their displacement-while some batteries remained to keep up fire-was a slow, painful process. At 2000 the battle along the Schnberg road flared up again. When the raiders turned back to rejoin Remer they found the American tankers waiting; however, evasion in the woods was easy, although at this point the prized vehicles were abandoned and most of the captured Americans escaped. The gunners, as infantry observers reported, "threw everything at Wallerode but the shoes on their feet." The business of computing the lateral movement of an armored division close to a front through which the enemy was breaking could hardly attain the exactness of a Leavenworth solution complete with march graphs and tables. This decision rested with Field Marshal Montgomery, the newly assigned commander of all Allied forces north of the German salient, who had been authorized by the Supreme Commander to give up such ground as was necessary in order to assemble sufficient strength for a decisive counterattack. won partial control of Crombach and were sitting across the road in the rear of the American tanks and riflemen to the east of the village. Brig. On 18 December the 7th Armored had learned in a roundabout way that a "Lieutenant Colonel named Stone" had collected a few troops and was holding Gouvy. (It will be remembered that the 18th Volks Grenadier Division was charged with the encirclement and capture of St. When CCB of the 9th Armored, the 424th Infantry, and the larger part of CCB, 7th Armored, had peeled away in layers from the ring, the last two combat commands of the 7th Armored defending the Poteau-Vielsalm highway had to be drawn off. hand, the bulk of the 23d Armored Infantry Battalion appeared to reinforce A small German attack hit the right flank just as the move was being. CG was well pleased with everything you have done. In a matter of minutes German infantry and tanks were to the rear of the foxhole line. The real punch in the forthcoming attack would be delivered by the tanks belonging to the Fuehrer Begleit Brigade. As the cavalry commenced its delaying action a hurried call went out to CCB, 9th Armored, for tanks and antitank guns. There is a postscript to this story. But unit integrity had been lost, the armored components were far below strength, and many of the armored infantry were weary, ill-equipped stragglers who had been put back in the line after their escape from St. Vith. The main danger, apparent since 19 December, was the open south flank of the St. Vith defense hanging on the air at Holdingen. The 7th Armored counterattack from St. Vith to relieve the two trapped regiments of the 106th Division had been postponed on the 17th, not canceled. CCR headquarters had meanwhile become ensnarled with the remnants of the 14th Cavalry Group and the residue of the corps artillery columns at the little village of Poteau, where the roads from Recht and St. Vith join en route to Vielsalm. Hasbrouck earlier had been "suspicious" of what was happening in the northern sector around Recht and Poteau, but he was no longer too apprehensive after the successive march groups of the 1st SS Panzer Division had bounced off the 7th Armored Division roadblocks. This, one of his division commanders opined, was easier said than done. Colonel Wemple and other officers restored a line, but when daylight came it was hard to tell whether friend or foe really held Crombach. It must be added, however, that Lucht's LXVI Corps was not in position to bring off the smashing attack against St. Vith which had been set tentatively for the 20th. At Commanster a traffic jam started. Trucks loaded with soldiers and nurses from a nearby hospital, supply vehicles, and civilians of military age on bicycles eddied around the square in an attempt to get on the road leading out to the west; a battalion from a replacement depot threaded its way on foot between the vehicles, also en route to the west. The orders given the 7th Armored Division still held-to assist the 106th Division. Stone), and a light tank platoon had been sent to set up an outpost at the village. this: pivoting on Malmdy, to continue the advance to the southeast and east with "utmost vigor," driving back the German forces found west of the line Malmdy-Pont-Vielsalm-Hebronval-Houffalize. nor did the American outposts on the Schnberg road catch any sound As part of the reorganization on the 19th, CCB, 7th Armored, took over the 17th Tank Battalion, which had been holding the road southeast of Recht. The panzer grenadier regiment and the assault guns therefore were ordered off their assigned route and turned northeast to follow the column through Stavelot. Description. It was important, however, as the knot which tied the roads running

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